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Arctic Hydrocarbon Exploration & Production: 
Evaluating the Legal Regime for Offshore Accidental 
Pollution Liability 
Sergei Vinogradov & Smith I. Azubuike 
The Arctic has enormous hydrocarbon potential which is attracting international oil companies to invest, explore and exploit 
its reserves. Drilling in this region presents infrastructural, technological and environmental challenges with high accidental 
pollution risks involved. In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon incident of 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico, there are serious 
concerns about the effects and legal consequences of a possible major oil spill. This calls into question the adequacy of existing 
global and regional regulatory frameworks governing accidental pollution, particularly in such important area as oil pollution 
damage liability and compensation. It is important that an international regime is in place that provides prompt and adequate 
compensation to the victims of pollution and remedial measures necessary to protect the Arctic environment and innocent third 
parties. This paper examines and evaluates global and regional regulations pertinent to pollution resulting from offshore 
petroleum operations in the Arctic, focusing especially on accident pollution liability and compensation from offshore facilities. 
A regional intergovernmental framework or an industry-wide compensation scheme would be among the most obvious options 
in addressing the apparent gap in the existing environmental regime of the Arctic. 
Introduction 
Geographically, the Arctic is defined as the region situated north of the Arctic Circle (U.S Energy 
Information Administration, 2012). A simple definition is that it is approximately 66 degrees North 
parallel, enclosing parts of Alaska (USA), Canada, Greenland (Denmark), Iceland, Sweden, 
Norway, Finland, and Russia (Johnstone, 2015). The economic and hydrocarbon potential of the 
Arctic region is gradually attracting global interest (Kaiser, Fernandez & Vestergaard, 2016). 
Viewed as the final frontier for conventional hydrocarbon development, it is likely to become the 
most promising area for international oil companies (IOCs) in the near future.  
The Arctic is portrayed as one of the few unspoiled ecosystems with limited human interaction, 
although offshore exploration began in the 1970s, with about 10,000 wells drilled to date (Sahu, 
2016). It is mostly occupied by Indigenous peoples and has unique environmental characteristics 
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which can be affected by large-scale economic activities (Newman, Biddulph & Binnion, 2014; 
Scarpa, 2014). There are over four million people including thirty Indigenous groups living in the 
region (Stouwe, 2017).  
An oil spill could damage all aspects of the ecosystem (Gordeeva, 2013). As the Arctic ice cover is 
gradually decreasing due to climate change, the prospects for hydrocarbon exploration and 
production (E&P) in places that were inaccessible before are increasing (Osofsky, Shadian & 
Fechtelkotter, 2016; Ebinger, et al., 2014). The Arctic has valuable marine living resources which 
could be affected by large scale E&P activities. Presently, there exists no confirmed technology 
that could remove oil pollution from under the ice, although some areas where petroleum 
production will be taking place are already ice free. The main environmental concern is about the 
impact of possible oil spills on Arctic waters and the transboundary dimension this could assume, 
calling into question the effectiveness of the existing emergency preparedness and response 
measures in the Arctic, as well as the adequacy of the liability and compensation regime for 
offshore pollution damage arising from hydrocarbon E&P. These concerns are informed by the 
Macondo incident in the Gulf of Mexico and the damage it caused to local fishermen, businesses 
and tourism. The Macondo oil spill impacted the shorelines of about five littoral states in the U.S. 
and was capped after 87 days (The Guardian, 2010).  
With offshore drilling operations significantly benefiting the Arctic countries’ economies, it is 
imperative that an international or an Arctic-specific regime is in place to address accidental 
pollution liability and emergency response, to adequately protect the Arctic environment and 
innocent third parties. Although non-binding vessel-focused pollution prevention measures have 
been developed within the Arctic Council, a rather soft regional institutional mechanism (Sahu, 
2016), no Arctic-wide offshore liability regime exists today to address accidental pollution arising 
from hydrocarbon E&P. The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate global and regional 
regulations pertinent to pollution resulting from offshore petroleum operations, focusing 
especially on liability for accidental pollution damage. This paper suggests that an industry-wide 
compensation scheme or a binding regional instrument would be two most likely options in 
establishing an accidental pollution liability regime for the Arctic Ocean. 
Hydrocarbon Potential of the Arctic 
Global interests in developing Arctic hydrocarbon resources have been growing fast. This 
attention has been influenced largely by the demand for energy and significant potential oil and 
gas resources of this frontier region (Kaiser et al., 2016). It is estimated that the entire Arctic holds 
more than 87% of the earth’s oil and natural gas reserves (Murray, 2018). These estimates were 
based on a probabilistic methodology of geologic analysis and analogue modelling; they are 
however not final (Bishop, Bremner, Laake, Parno & Utskot, 2011). The US Geological Survey, in 
2008, assessed the oil and gas potential of the North Arctic Circle and indicated that it holds about 
90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and a possible 44 billion barrels 
of undiscovered natural gas liquids, with 84% of these located offshore (USGS, 2008). These 
estimated figures represent 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil resources and 30% of world’s 
undiscovered natural gas resources (Ebinger, Banks & Schackman, 2014).  
Similar estimates from Russia support assessment of the significant petroleum potential of the 
Arctic (Schofield & Potts, 2008; Baev, 2007). Russian scientists used the regression relationship 
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method to calculate the probabilistic estimate of oil and gas resources of the Eurasia sedimentary 
basin in the Arctic Ocean (Kontorovich et al., 2010). The findings show that in the second half of 
the century, the Arctic petroleum super basin could provide the required energy resources that are 
comparable to those of the West Siberian petroleum basin or the Persian Gulf (Kontorovich et al., 
2010). The bulk of the estimated oil and gas can only be retrieved through complex offshore 
drilling techniques; about 80% of the Arctic energy resources are situated in the areas covered by 
ice for most of the year (Osofsky et al., 2016). More than 15 oil and gas fields have been discovered 
in the Kara, Pechora, and Barents Seas of the Russian Arctic region (Bishop et al., 2010).  
Recent oil discoveries in the Nanushuk and Torok formations announced during 2015-2017 in the 
US, indicate that the North Alaska Slope holds significant reserves (USGS, 2017). In 2011, the 
Prudhoe Bay field in Alaska’s North Slope was estimated to hold about 2.1 billion m3 of 
recoverable oil, out of the 4.0 billion m3 estimated. It also has a projected 736 billion m3 of 
recoverable natural gas, out of 1.3 trillion m3 estimated (Bishop et al., 2011). The Drake gas field 
in the Canadian Arctic has been evaluated to hold 153 billion m3 of gas, while about 453,160 m3 
of oil was extracted from the Bent Horn field on Cameron Island from 1985-1996 (Bishop et al., 
2011). The Norwegian Snohvit field is also estimated to hold significant recoverable reserves.  
The territories controlled by the five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean - Canada, US, Norway, 
Russia, and Greenland (Denmark) - hold more than three-quarters of the Arctic resources 
(Henderson & Leo, 2014). As ice covered areas diminish due to the increase of global 
temperatures, these resources are becoming more accessible, opening new opportunities for 
hydrocarbon development and transportation to world markets, through the Northern Sea routes 
(ibid). Recent innovations in extraction technologies and ship design enable access to the Arctic 
resources, thereby increasing energy security in the twenty-first century (Stouwe, 2017). The 
resource potential of the region has led to the Arctic being branded as the “new energy province” 
(Østhagen, 2013).  
Existing and Prospective E&P Activities in the Arctic 
Energy companies have made high-profile forays into the Arctic to develop its oil and gas 
resources. Prior to this recent interest, there had been several rather earlier attempts to develop 
hydrocarbons in the Arctic. In 1968, Standard Oil and ARCO drilled a well that tapped the largest 
oil field in Prudhoe Bay on the North Slope of Alaska. Production started in 1977 after the trans-
Alaska Pipeline System from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez was completed (Tippee, 2015). As time went 
on, Shell also discovered oil in the Arctic in 1980, and in 2012, BP found oil at its Liberty field in 
the Beaufort Sea; but high production costs had led to the abandonment of these discoveries. 
In the Far North and the Arctic Norwegian and Russian waters, Gazprom, Statoil and Rosneft 
carried out E&P activities over several years (Wilson Center, 2014). In the Barents Sea, about 130 
wells have been drilled to date with mixed results (Murray, 2018). At the Goliath field in the Barents 
Sea, Eni Norge AS has been producing for about a year. In January 2017 Statoil discovered oil and 
gas in the Cape Vulture well, followed by two additional finds in July (Murray, 2018).  
In the Russian waters of the Arctic, Gazprom is progressing in the Pechora Sea (Stouwe, 2017). 
In 2014, the Rosneft-ExxonMobil venture successfully completed the drilling of the northernmost 
well in the world - the Universitetskaya-1 well in the Kara Sea oil province (Rosneft, 2014). As of 
January 2017, Rosneft owns 55 licenses in the offshore areas of the Arctic (Rosneft, 2018).  
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In the Nikaitchuq field offshore the North Slope of Alaska, Eni has attained its production goal 
of 25,000 barrel per day. In a water depth of 3 metres, the field holds reserves estimated at 200 
MMboe (Offshore Energy, 2014).  
Exploratory drilling in the Canadian Arctic could be traced to the Canadian Beaufort in 1972. 
Although activity in the region slowed down in the 1980s, renewed exploratory efforts resumed in 
the early 2000s. It is Canada’s largest offshore oil project and remains an important test case along 
the Arctic learning curve. Hibernia in the Canadian sub-Arctic waters is one of the biggest resource 
development projects (Stouwe, 2017).  
In Greenland, the first substantial offshore seismic surveys were carried out and experimental wells 
drilled in West Greenland in the 1970s, and another exploratory well drilled in 2011, albeit, with 
little success. Despite this, Tullow Oil accepted to buy a 40% stake in an exploration block in the 
Baffin Bay.  
These discoveries have shown that hydrocarbon development in the fragile Arctic environment is 
gaining pace (Wilson Center, 2014). Experts forecast that by 2030, geological exploration will 
mainly be carried out on the Arctic shelf, and petroleum deposits in the area will be prepared for 
further, large-scale development (RIAC, 2015). The exploratory efforts have raised global 
awareness and concerns about the Arctic environment in the event of a significant oil spill. While 
IOCs continue to invest in and ramp up exploration, development, and production operations 
across this frontier region, serious regulatory, environmental, and technological challenges that 
face hydrocarbon operations must be properly addressed (Tippee, 2015).  
Offshore Operations and their Possible Effects 
Offshore E&P activities are risky. They involve the extraction of hydrocarbons, require the use of 
potentially harmful substances and produce various emissions and discharges (E&P Forum & 
UNEP, 1997). Accidental pollution caused by gas blowouts, oil spills and chemical spills during 
offshore petroleum development could result in possible or actual harm to the environment, in 
the form of physical, chemical, and biological disturbances in the water column, on the seabed, 
and in the atmosphere (Vinogradov, 2013). The Arctic is particularly fragile in this respect, being 
home to Indigenous populationS and important marine resources, and is characterised by special 
environmental vulnerabilities. It is exposed to possible impacts from various marine activities 
(Arctic Council, 2009) such as accidental releases of oil during petroleum extraction and 
transportation. E&P may cause oil pollution, which is considered one of the six priority 
environmental problems threatening the Arctic. Others are radioactivity, persistent organic 
contaminants, noise, heavy metals, and acidification (Koivurova, Kankaanpaa & Stepien, 2015).  
The melting of the ice cover has improved access to mineral resource development (Schofield & 
Potts, 2008) and heightened IOCs interests to explore and exploit this resource-rich region 
(Stouwe, 2017). An assessment of hydrocarbon activities by the Arctic Council shows that at 
present the extent of oil pollution in the Arctic is low and is mostly related to natural seepage. 
However, it was noted that an accidental oil pollution is the largest threat to the marine 
environment (Arctic Council, 2009). In the event of an oil spill, the response time is substantially 
slower, as containment crew must wait for temperate seasons to assess damage. Although chemical 
dispersants could reduce the extent of an oil spill (Lewis & Prince, 2018), they are highly toxic. A 
combination of crude oil and dispersants significantly increases their toxicity and potential impact 
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on microzooplankton and planktonic communities (Almeda, Hyatt & Buskey, 2014). Due to tightly 
interwoven food chains, high north ecosystems are uniquely vulnerable to substantial disruptions 
resulting from oil spills (Stouwe, 2017).  
The apparent vulnerability of the Arctic environment has led to calls for a moratorium on offshore 
activities in the Arctic (UKPEC, 2012), especially as the Gulf of Mexico oil spill has shown the 
difficulty of clean-up even in the significantly more favourable climate and weather conditions 
(Cunningham, 2012). Oil pollution is slow to disappear, while sub-zero temperatures, darkness and 
sea ice may impede access to spill-covered areas and reduce the effectiveness of clean-up 
techniques and operations (National Research Council, 2014).   
The frontier’s biodiversity is unique but not sufficiently understood. The changing climatic 
conditions may increase the frequency of storm surges, making it more likely for an oil spill to 
reach coastlines and damage coastal species (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013). Another challenge is 
the fact that regulatory enforcement is extremely difficult in the High North. Regulatory agencies 
are usually “captured” by industry interests, whom they depend upon for personnel and technical 
expertise. Agencies find it difficult to set adequate standards without corporate assistance, and this 
power asymmetry tilts the scale in favour of IOCs (Stouwe, 2017).  
A Macondo-type disaster would be catastrophic for the Arctic. It is the duty of both relevant 
national governments and the international and business community to take on this challenge. It 
has been asserted that IOCs and the Arctic coastal states are far from ready to effectively deal with 
major oil spills in the Arctic (Nunez, 2014). There is no doubt that the impact of oil pollution on 
the Arctic ecosystems and vulnerable marine living resources could be devastating and long-lasting. 
This is so as toxic substances could remain in the marine environment for decades and be 
transported by ice floes over large distances while affecting wildlife and the pristine environment 
(Cameron, 2015).  
Legal Regime of the Arctic: An Environmental Perspective 
The legal regime of the Arctic represents a combination of different global and regional 
environmental treaties and soft law instruments (Sahu, 2016). The protection of the Arctic is 
achieved using mainstream and side-stream regulations. Some global conventions, primarily related 
to the law of the sea, and polar-specifics regulations, including those passed by the Arctic Council, 
constitute the mainstream regime. Individual efforts of the coastal states to protect their northern 
shores and waters constitute the side-stream regime (Stouwe, 2017).  
Applicable hard law comprises customary rules and relevant treaty provisions that are legally 
binding and define or prohibit the specific states’ conduct (Canuel, 2015). When states consent to 
implied customary law or treaty-based hard law, they are bound by it, albeit, compliance issues 
arise sometimes when an international norm conflicts with perceived national interest (ASIL & 
ILA, 1991). It is a customary international law obligation of a coastal state to ensure that 
hydrocarbon activities within its marine environment do not result in transboundary 
environmental harm to other states (Bosma, 2012). 
International environmental law and its principles play a vital role in governing various economic 
activities in the Arctic. UNCLOS and other global treaties, such as the Biodiversity, Persistent 
Organic Pollutants and the Climate Change conventions, are all relevant in terms of environmental 
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protection of the Arctic. They provide general guidelines for the protection of the environment 
during petroleum operations.  
Regional legal frameworks also govern some economic activities in the Arctic, at least in certain 
geographic areas. These include the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the North-East Atlantic (the OSPAR Convention).  
The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), a “soft law” framework for environmental 
cooperation, and its successor, the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum established in 
1996, are also part of the Arctic legal regime, although of a non-binding nature (Nowlan, 2001). 
The Arctic Council is the main regional institutional mechanism intended to provide a platform 
for cooperation on various issues among the Arctic states. It does not have a legal personality as 
an intergovernmental organization, and its regulations are simple recommendations (ibid). It has 
launched several programmes with mandates relevant to environmental protection. As far as 
accidental oil pollution arising from E&P activities is concerned, the Arctic environmental regime, 
as will be shown later, is rather piecemeal compared to other regional seas. While coastal states 
may have sufficiently developed national regulatory frameworks for offshore E&P operations, the 
Arctic-wide regime for compensating other coastal states and victims of pollution, including 
Indigenous peoples, is missing. The fundamental question here is which liability and compensation 
regime should govern compensation for environmental harm, including transboundary damage, 
caused by accidents in the Arctic either within the coastal states’ jurisdiction or beyond it. 
UNCLOS and Other Global Instruments  
No special international regime applies to hydrocarbon development in the Arctic (Johnstone, 
2016). As earlier stated, such activities are governed by general international law, mainly in the 
form of 1982 UNCLOS and its implementation agreements (Cinelli, 2014). UNCLOS is often 
referred to as the “constitution for the seas” (Fowler, 2012). Art. 192 of UNCLOS obligates states to 
protect and preserve the marine environment. UNCLOS codifies the rights of various states, 
determines the limits of various maritime zones, from the territorial sea to the Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZ) and the continental shelf, and establishes applicable rules associated with marine 
scientific research in the Arctic, and the rights and responsibilities for marine environmental 
protection (Joyner, 2009). 
Under Article 194 of UNCLOS, there exists a duty to take all necessary measures to prevent, 
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment. Article 194 (3) expressly refers to 
“pollution from installations and devices” used to explore and exploit natural resources from the seabed 
and subsoil. In particular, such measures must aim at preventing accidents and dealing with 
emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction, 
equipment, operation and manning of such installations or devices. Clearly, this obligation applies 
to hydrocarbon E&P in the Arctic. 
Further to this general obligation, there are two more specific provisions related to offshore 
operations - Articles 208 and 214, that directly relate to the prevention and control of operational 
and accidental marine pollution resulting from offshore E&P. Together these articles embrace 
both aspects of anti-pollution measures: regulation and enforcement. Article 208 obliges states to 
adopt laws and regulations that will prevent, reduce and control pollution emanating from seabed 
activities, and to harmonise and cooperate with other states to create a regional framework to 
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address marine pollution. Article 214 also deals with the issue of pollution resulting from seabed 
activities under the jurisdiction of coastal states. It complements Article 208 and operates as an 
enforcement provision (Vinogradov & Wagner, 1998).  
There is one Arctic-specific provision in UNCLOS, which however applies to navigation only. 
Under Article 234, coastal states have a right to make laws that are non-discriminatory to prevent, 
reduce and control vessel-related pollution in ice-covered areas within their Exclusive Economic 
Zones.  However, Art. 234 does not provide for an adequate legal mechanism to protect the Arctic 
environment from other sources (Stouwe, 2017). UNCLOS does not stipulate either the content 
or procedures that should be followed to prevent such pollution of the Arctic Ocean (Rixey, 2016). 
Russia and Canada have explicitly referred to Article 234 as the basis for their unilateral 
introduction of additional environmental regulations and, in the case of Russia, icebreaker escort 
fees to ensure the safety of the environment and seafarers in their respective Arctic EEZ (Fields, 
2015). While this provision applies only to navigation, there is nothing in either UNCLOS or 
general international law which precludes coastal states from establishing and enforcing stricter 
measures with respect to offshore E&P operations in their Arctic waters. 
Finally, Article 197 calls for environmental cooperation, where appropriate, on a regional basis, 
directly or through competent international organisations. Such cooperation should focus 
primarily on formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and international practices 
and procedures for the protection of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic 
regional features. The Arctic is a particularly sensitive and vulnerable maritime region where 
cooperation among its coastal states and other countries using it is essential. From this perspective, 
it is important to analyse and assess the emerging regional environmental regime of the Arctic 
Ocean to ascertain its effectiveness, especially regarding petroleum E&P. This is essential as 
UNCLOS strongly encourages regional solutions to prevent, reduce and control pollution in the 
Arctic (Stokke, 2009). 
Apart from UNCLOS, there are several international conventions aimed at protecting the marine 
environment which were adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation. 
The most relevant among them in the context of this paper are the International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) of 1992, the Fund Convention of 1992, and the 
2003 Supplementary Fund, which may offer possible solutions for the Arctic. The aim of the CLC 
1992 was to ensure adequate compensation for victims of vessel-based accidental pollution 
damage. The CLC provides for a strict liability regime against a ship owner with limited exceptions 
for acts of war, third party intentional acts, and the wrongful acts of an authority responsible for 
navigation (Art. 3, CLC 1992). The strict liability approach was chosen to ensure optimal 
compensation to the victims of accidental pollution (Hui, 2007). 
The CLC requires mandatory insurance to cover ship owner’s liability (Art. 7, CLC 1992) 
essentially to guarantee such compensation (Verheij, 2007). The limit of the ship owner’s liability 
is calculated based on the tonnage of the vessel (Art. 5, CLC 1992), and victims could claim directly 
from the ship owner’s insurer or the provider of the financial security (Art. 7 (8), CLC 1992). After 
the 2000 amendment, the maximum amount payable by a ship owner is 89,770,000 Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR). However, the CLC has been criticised for having a low maximum amount 
which may not compensate for a large-scale damage, thus defeating the goal of prompt and 
adequate compensation set out by the regime (Mason, 2002). 
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To accommodate this criticism, the 1992 Fund was established to provide compensation for 
victims who do not obtain full compensation under the CLC. The 1992 Fund functions as an 
alternative source of payments and as a second-tier compensation mechanism for claim settlement 
(Art. 3 (2), CLC 1992). Thus, it provides victims with realistic opportunities of recourse, and a 
wider scope of claims application (Pavliha & Grbec, 2008). Through contributions from the 
shipping and oil industry, compensation is available under the CLC and Fund regime, thus 
facilitating risk spreading between different parties. 
Despite the seemingly wide scope of the Fund and substantial amount available, subsequent 
incidents demonstrated that the CLC and the Fund were inadequate to provide compensations in 
the most severe cases, as some claims may surpass the liability limit under the two instruments 
(Hui, 2011). The combined amount of compensation available under the CLC and Fund was 203 
million SDR. This limitation paved the way to the adoption of the 2003 Supplementary Fund 
Protocol to ensure availability of adequate funds for compensation payment. The limit was 
increased to 750 million SDR (Art. 4, 2003 Fund Protocol). The 2003 Fund operates as an 
additional tier of compensation and applies when the joint coverage under the CLC and the 1992 
Fund is insufficient.  It is derived from levies collected from companies situated in the contracting 
states that receive more than 150,000 tons of oil per year (Art. 10, 2003 Fund Protocol). Yet, the 
liability limit under the 2003 Fund is still inadequate in addressing potential damage caused by a 
major spill in the Arctic. 
The regime has achieved a balance between various competing interests as it continues to ensure 
prompt and adequate payment of compensation for pollution damage. The entire CLC regime 
offers certain options for the Arctic region. The success of the CLC as a model for developing an 
international liability mechanism for the marine transportation of hazardous and noxious 
substances is an indication of its likely applicability in the Arctic region.  
Regional Environmental Frameworks in the Arctic 
It has been earlier mentioned that there is no single regional convention governing the 
environmental protection of the Arctic Ocean, including offshore oil and gas activities. What is 
currently in place is a combination of some regional binding and soft law instruments in the form 
of numerous guidelines and recommended practices. This could relate to the fact that the Ottawa 
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council does not impose legally binding 
responsibilities on any of its members and that the Arctic Council is also not authorised to do so 
(Koivurova & Molenaar, 2009). The Arctic Council’s position and role could and should be 
strengthened to improve the effectiveness of environmental cooperation. 
The most relevant regional environmental regime which applies partly to the areas under the 
jurisdiction of some Arctic states is the OSPAR Convention. It was open for signature at the 
Ministerial Meeting of the Oslo and Paris Commissions on 22 September 1992. The OSPAR 
Convention replaced two instruments concerning land-based pollution and dumping adopted in 
the early 1970s. It provides a broad normative framework and an institutional mechanism (the 
OSPAR Commission) for regional cooperation. One important feature of the OSPAR regime is 
its geographical coverage, which includes Region I (Arctic waters) that constitutes approximately 
40% of the OSPAR maritime area. 
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In addition to the general obligation regarding the prevention and elimination of pollution from 
“offshore sources” (Article 5), it has Annex III regarding offshore installations. However, neither 
the OSPAR Convention, nor its Annex III contain technical requirements and standards, leaving 
this to be developed by the Commission through its agreements, decisions and recommendations. 
The OSPAR Convention focuses almost entirely on regulating operational pollution and the 
disposal of disused offshore platforms (Vinogradov, 2013).  
Some soft law instruments embrace internationally accepted technical norms, standards and 
practices that have been institutionalised (Koivurova et al., 2015). Although they influence states’ 
behaviour, they do not create an excessive burden or obligation on the respective states. Soft law 
instruments play an important role in shaping the actor’s behaviour, both in terms of their general 
conduct and, especially, when it comes to regulating some specific industrial or commercial 
activities. The Arctic Council has produced important guidelines, including the 2009 Arctic 
Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines. The purpose of the guidelines is for the Arctic nations to use 
them during petroleum operations by applying common policy and practices (Arctic Council, 
2009d). The objective is to assist regulators in designing standards, which are applied and enforced 
consistently for all offshore hydrocarbon operators in the Arctic. The guidelines are non-binding 
and are intended only to encourage the application of the highest standards of petroleum 
operations. The Council’s various task forces, working groups, and adopted documents aimed at 
achieving the Council’s twin aims - environmental protection and sustainable development of the 
Arctic natural resources (Canuel, 2015).  
In 2013, the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in 
the Arctic was adopted to serve as a legal platform for prompt and effective action and cooperation 
in the event of an oil pollution incident. In 2015, the Arctic Council approved the “Framework 
Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in 
the Marine Areas of the Arctic” (Framework Plan). The Framework Plan aims to strengthen 
cooperation, including exchange of information, in the field of prevention of marine oil pollution. 
However, both the hard law instruments and soft law guidelines are practically silent on the issue 
of accidental oil pollution damage to the environment and this question requires more detailed 
analysis which will follow.    
Accidental Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation in the Arctic   
Current Status 
While accidental oil pollution is one the most serious issues that threatens the Arctic, the region 
does not have a proper legal regime that addresses liability and compensation for damage arising 
from E&P activities. Although various national laws govern hydrocarbon E&P in the Arctic 
waters, these regulations are not harmonised, neither do they provide adequate protection to the 
victims of pollution in the case of transboundary environmental harm. There are considerable 
differences in relevant national regimes which can lead to ambiguities and unnecessary delays and 
inadequate compensation (Lahn & Emmerson, 2012). As states look to address the unique 
challenges of regulating offshore drilling activities in the Arctic region, a major concern is the 
liability limits set out in national regulations (Byers, 2012). The liability for offshore pollution 
damage in Russia, Norway and Greenland is unlimited, whereas that of US and Canada is limited 
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(Lahn & Emmerson, 2012). The US Oil Pollution Act of 1990 sets the limit of liability at $75 
million for economic and natural resource damage, although no limit standard applies for gross 
negligence (33 U.S.C S2701 of OPA). Liability for offshore pollution damage in the Canadian 
Arctic is $40 million under the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. 
A fundamental question with respect to liability for pollution damage in the Arctic is which liability 
regime should apply. Stakeholders in the Arctic region have expressed divergent views on this 
issue. Non-governmental organisations in the region argue that the liability cap should be removed. 
The reason advanced is that the environment is vulnerable, the climate is harsh, and that there is 
no precedent to base cost assessment for damage caused to the environment (Lahn & Emmerson, 
2012). Some scholars posit that liability caps prevent cost internalisation and can facilitate activities 
that do not make economic sense from an inclusive viewpoint (Byers, 2012). Oil companies and 
some states hold a contrary view. Unlimited liability is usually assumed to create a risk too great 
for investors as it does not ensure certainty in insurance, although some investors may accept it as 
a way of covering for the current and future loss of fishing revenues by locals (Vanderklippe, 2011) 
Again, how to address victims’ claims where the liability limit is low, and what limit of financial 
responsibility to apply, is an issue of debate in the Arctic region (Lahn & Emmerson, 2012). In the 
U.S, the demonstration of financial capacity is set at 150 million USD. In Greenland, the 2010 
Baffin Bay licensing rounds required companies to have at least 10 billion USD of equity to qualify, 
and small companies were required to provide a 2 billion USD bond for clean-up in the event of 
a spill (Webb, 2010). States and companies may be unable to act alone in the event of a disaster 
and the liability regime of a state may limit victims’ claims as the amounts vary (Lahn & Emmerson, 
2012). It therefore seems necessary to harmonise national regimes in the Arctic region for a more 
effective liability framework.  
Under Article 235 of UNCLOS, states are obligated to ensure that recourse is available for 
adequate compensation or other relief, and to ensure this, it is the duty of states to cooperate in 
the implementation of existing international law, and the development of the law regarding liability 
and compensation for marine pollution damage. This provision also emphasises the need for the 
development of criteria and procedures, such as compulsory insurance or compensation funds, for 
payment of adequate compensation. This highlights the importance of a robust and streamlined 
regime that would allow for adequate compensation and a well-considered liability limit in the 
fragile Arctic region.  
At present “existing international law” relating to liability and compensation for oil damage to the 
marine environment is limited to accidental pollution arising from navigation only. There is a well-
established global regime governing civil liability for pollution damage caused by maritime 
accidents involving transportation of oil. However, nothing of this kind at either the global or 
regional level exists with respect to petroleum E&P. The 1977 Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage that could have been relevant, is not in force and in practical terms is 
obsolete. Thus, in view of the advent of large-scale E&P operations in the Arctic there is a clear 
need to consider adequate liability and compensation schemes and mechanisms with respect to 
offshore pollution, if not global, at least regional, especially for the vulnerable Arctic Ocean.   
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Options for Liability and Compensation Schemes    
In the face of environmental challenges and increasing economic activities in the Arctic, questions 
have been raised over the sufficiency of the existing regime to manage and protect this frontier 
region (Stokke, 2009). This paper identified as one such issue the absence of a regional liability and 
compensation scheme for damage caused by E&P activities in the Arctic. As IOCs look towards 
expanding their operations in this region, one may consider various options to fill this obvious 
gap, including primarily two: an industry-specific private compensation mechanism modelled on 
the OPOL scheme and a regional intergovernmental civil liability regime.  
Using the OPOL-type Framework 
One possible solution in addressing the regime gap in the Arctic is an OPOL-type framework for 
pollution liability arising from the hydrocarbon E&P operations. The Offshore Pollution Liability 
Association Limited is an industry body in the oil sector, set up as a company limited to administer 
a voluntary but strict liability compensation scheme known as the Offshore Pollution Liability 
Agreement (OPOL) (Faure & Liu, 2017). The OPOL is an agreement between several major oil 
companies, intended to make compensation available to the victims of oil pollution damage 
emanating from an offshore facility or reimbursement to public authorities for remedial measures 
carried out following a spill (Clause IV, OPOL). OPOL was designed to fill the gap in the UK 
pending the ratification of the 1977 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources (1977 CLEE) 
(Rochette, Wemaere, Chabason & Callet, 2014). However, the CLEE was never ratified, and 
OPOL remains the only instrument at present to address the issue of accidental pollution liability 
not only in the North Sea and adjacent areas, but globally. 
OPOL’s origin is traceable to the UK. It entered into force on 1 May 1975 as an agreement 
between all offshore operators in the UK (Faure & Liu, 2017). Its coverage was extended to 
offshore facilities within the jurisdiction of other states: Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, the Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, the Isle of Man, the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland. This means that OPOL applies to some Arctic waters.  
The legal nature of the OPOL agreement is a contractual arrangement by offshore installation 
operators (Bonfanti & Jacur, 2014) and is based on the principle of a strict but limited liability. 
Membership of OPOL is a condition for the granting of a licence in the UK (Faure & Liu, 2017). 
Outside the UK, OPOL membership has declined as there is no regulatory duty to be a member 
in states such as Germany, France or Denmark (Faure & Liu, 2017). Presently, the total liability of 
an operator under OPOL is capped at 250 million USD per incident, with a requirement for 
members to “establish and maintain” financial responsibility to ensure that claims are met (Clause 
II 2c, OPOL), evidenced through insurance or self-insurance (Rochette et al., 2014). Claims to be 
considered as admissible include clean-up operations on shore or at sea, property damage, disposal 
costs of collected material, other losses which must be quantifiable, and which must result directly 
from the contamination. OPOL does not take away a claimant’s right to seek redress through the 
courts for losses exceeding the recoverable maximum, or those beyond the scope of the 
Agreement. 
A commendable feature of the OPOL regime is that it appears to demonstrate the industry’s 
commitment to make available adequate coverage of pollution damage. Again, if a member is 
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unable to meet its obligation due to insolvency, other members are obligated to contribute in 
proportion to the number of their offshore facilities at the time of the incident. This guarantees 
that funds are available to meet claims, thus, ensuring expeditious claims settlement and enhancing 
mutual risk sharing in the case of insolvency. Furthermore, the strict liability obligation means that 
there is no need to prove fault, and the fact that liability is channelled to the operator takes away 
the question of attribution of liability when claims are to be lodged. 
There are, however, limitations to OPOL. It is not a fund but a contractual arrangement to 
compensate losses where a member fails to meet its obligation (Hancock & Stone, 1982). It means 
that OPOL will not intervene where there is no insolvency. OPOL does not prevent a claimant 
from suing the operator for other types of damages (Faure & Liu, 2017). Its definition of direct 
loss or damage appears limited in scope. Whether damage caused to the environment falls under 
this definition is debateable (Rochette et al., 2014). Finally, OPOL’s liability limit pales in 
comparison with the extent of damage occasioned by the Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf 
of Mexico (Smith, 2011).  
Although the OPOL’s compensation limit is quite high, it may still be inadequate in the event of 
a major offshore catastrophe. However, it is unclear whether the industry will be willing to raise 
the limit to a point that assures adequate compensation. Recalling that the Arctic has a challenging 
environment and a fragile ecosystem, a major oil spill in its waters could result in huge damage. 
OPOL has not been tested, and the adequacy of its application in the Arctic may be questionable. 
Nevertheless, OPOL demonstrates a potential governing option for liability and compensation for 
E&P activities in the Arctic region, if expended or modelled upon. This is so as it was established 
by operators (Churchill, 2001). OPOL can be improved by increasing the limit of liability to cover 
a Macondo-type damage; setting up a fund to address claims in excess of the liability limit. Some 
OPOL “designated states” are also members of the Arctic Council, thus, the regime will not be 
entirely new to them.  
Creating a Regional Liability Regime  
Another possible solution is to create a legally binding Arctic-wide framework establishing a 
liability regime for the region similar to the 1977 CLEE. The CLEE is restricted to the coastal 
states of the North Sea, Baltic Sea and the northern parts of the Atlantic Ocean (Sands, 2003). It 
is based on strict but limited liability channelled to the operator. However, the operator could be 
exempted from liability where the damage was caused by an act of God or from a well abandoned 
for longer than 5 years (Churchill, 2001). The Convention applies to petroleum operations on the 
seabed and covers fixed and mobile facilities offshore. The Convention deals with accidental oil 
pollution emanating from the coastal state’s jurisdiction, damages suffered because of the spill and 
compensation payable. It imposes a requirement of mandatory insurance for operators. 
Under the CLEE regime, there is no provision for a supplementary fund. Yet, it allows states 
where the offshore facility is situated to prescribe higher or unlimited liability for pollution damage. 
It must be reminded that the CLEE has never entered into force. This can be explained by 
disagreements regarding the standard and limitation of liability; lack of political will on the part of 
states to agree on important aspects of the convention; the absence of a separate fund to provide 
compensation for claims in excess of the limit of liability; states interest in uniformity of laws as 
opposed to states interest in stricter regulations for offshore operations; and disagreements 
regarding the potential magnitude of risk involved, among other reasons (Dubais, 1977).  
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A look at the regime established by the CLEE reveals some serious shortcomings. The absence of 
a supplementary fund undermines the effectiveness of the regime where claims exceed the liability 
limit. The power of states to establish a higher limit of liability could create non-uniformity, 
contrary to the aim of harmonisation of rules and procedure as stated in the preamble of the 
Convention.  Again, the operators were required to maintain insurance or financial security as a 
cover for liability, however, states could independently determine the amount, type and terms of 
the insurance. This could result in non-uniformity as well. The CLEE was criticised for setting a 
low liability limit of 35 million SDR (Ibid.). 
However, all the obvious shortcomings of the CLEE model do not necessarily negate this 
approach in principle as a possible option for the Arctic. Intergovernmental environmental 
frameworks adopted at the regional level, albeit not in the area of civil liability for accidental 
damage, have shown significant advantages due to their legally binding character and uniformity 
of the regulatory approach.     
Conclusion 
The analysis of different options discussed above from the viewpoint of an optimal model to be 
used in the Artic region, reveals that the applicability of a liability and compensation regime for oil 
pollution damage from offshore E&P operations may depend on several key factors. A strict but 
limited liability is essential to facilitate prompt and adequate compensation for damage caused by 
E&P activities. It enables cost internalization, and guarantees compensation irrespective of 
operator’s fault, especially in the oil industry’s complex contracting chain. It is also the prescribed 
standard for ultra-hazardous and high-risk activities such as offshore E&P (ILC, 2003). The strict 
liability requirement should be balanced with a liability limit to encourage its acceptance by the 
industry and ensure the availability of insurance to operators. Legal certainty is guaranteed in the 
insurance market when liability is strict but limited (Faure, 2009). 
Again, liability should be channelled to the operator as it enables the victim to identify the 
responsible party for the purpose of compensation. This is so as the operator is the party that 
designs the well programme, interfaces with the government, and receives the long-term financial 
upside from the petroleum operation (Cameron, 2012). The operator could still contractually 
allocate risks to other participants during E&P operations. Furthermore, the regime should 
provide for compulsory insurance or evidence of financial security to guarantee claims payment. 
Offshore energy insurance is one of the prerequisite conditions for the development of an 
international regime on liability for pollution damage (Shaw, 2012).  
The choice of options in terms of the final legal shape of the possible liability regime is rather 
limited. On the one hand, one may consider developing a proper intergovernmental legal 
framework analogous to the CLEE. However, the failed attempt to create such a regime in the 
maritime area famous for a very high degree of cooperation among the coastal states concerned 
does not bode well for its success in a divided and politically controversial regime such as the 
Arctic Ocean. Thus, on the other hand, what is more feasible is to apply the OPOL or develop an 
OPOL-type mechanism. At present OPOL, as a voluntary compensation scheme, provides an 
adequate platform for remedial action by operators of offshore facilities in the event of a spill. One 
substantial advantage of this scheme is the fact that it already applies by some of the Arctic or sub-
Arctic countries. It will not be particularly hard to extend the territorial scope of the scheme to 
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other Arctic countries. Or, alternatively, one may contemplate the establishment of a similar 
compensation scheme for the Arctic waters exclusively. Either option has advantages and 
shortcomings, which require further deliberation.    
An additional tier of compensation in the form of a supplementary fund may also be considered 
at some point. It would provide a wider scope for settling claims, especially when the damage 
significantly exceeds the established limit. Its funding could come from the oil industry and states 
as they are stakeholders too. State contribution could be based on the amount of oil produced or 
well drilled in a given jurisdiction. The Arctic Council may hypothetically be entrusted with 
managing such a supplementary fund. The liability regime should be able to facilitate prompt and 
adequate compensation by removing barriers that may prevent recourse, considering the potential 
magnitude of the risk and taking a cue from the extent of damage caused by the Deepwater 
Horizon incident. 
The Arctic states should exercise the political will and commit to a regional regime that will be 
adequate to provide necessary guarantees to both public authorities and juridical and physical 
persons in the event of an oil spill. Accidental pollution associated with offshore E&P activities, 
including large-scale discharge of oil, creates a very high environmental risk. In the light of the 
Macondo incident in the Gulf of Mexico and the Montara spill in the Sea of Timor, the need for 
a regional regulatory framework designed to deal with liability issues, which arise from oil pollution 
damage caused by offshore E&P, is obvious. While there are possible options available to the 
Arctic states, the most realistic would be to develop an industry-wide framework, which would 
cover all operators engaged in offshore E&P in the Arctic. This regime could be modelled on a 
modified version of the OPOL scheme and other conventions discussed, taking into consideration 
their key positive features.  
The Arctic states should be able to harmonize their policies at the appropriate regional level, and 
develop regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to address oil 
pollution from offshore facilities (Vinogradov, 2013). There have been suggestions to impose a 
moratorium on offshore activities until a strong civil liability regime, among other things, has been 
created in the Arctic (Johnstone, 2016). While this proposal may be viewed as extreme, there is 
indeed a need in a more vigorous cooperative effort to develop international law and adequate 
mechanisms to deal with the issue of liability and compensative on a regional level in the Arctic.  
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